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1From a blind truncheon to a one-eyed stick: testing in the lab an optional target-
based mechanism adapted to groundwater withdrawals 
Abstract:  
This paper proposes an optional target-based mechanism to improve the management of 
groundwater withdrawals when farmers’ behavior is imperfectly monitored. It combines a 
classical ambient tax (a blind truncheon), paid by the group of farmers when the water table 
level falls below a pre-defined target, with an optional individual contract that enables 
signatory farmers to signal their withdrawals and to avoid the collective sanction if they 
comply with an individual quota (a one-eyed stick). This mechanism is expected to be more 
acceptable than the ambient tax and to help reduce information asymmetries between the 
regulator and farmers. It is tested experimentally in the lab with a contextualized protocol. 
First results show that such mechanism reduces withdrawals but that subjects are able to 
coordinate in a repeated setting to extract an informational rent.  
Keywords:  
Groundwater management; Imperfect information; Target-based mechanism; Coordination 
game; Experimental economics. 
1. INTRODUCTION
Being a common-pool resource, groundwater is often subject to the well-known Tragedy of 
the Commons (Hardin 1968), namely overexploitation. Several economic instruments are 
mobilized to limit over-exploitation such as pumping taxes, water quotas or marketable 
pumping permits. However, they focus on individual behavior and impose that water 
managers be perfectly informed on each water user’s consumption. This is rarely the case in 
the real world.  When legal and administrative settings are insufficient to monitor individual 
withdrawals, for example when wells are neither officially declared to the authorities, nor 
properly metered, then the groundwater may present open-access resource features (Howe 
2002). Groundwater is withdrawn in an imperfect informational context and the above 
instruments become inoperative. 
Only little attention has been paid by scholars to the specific issue of groundwater 
withdrawals management under imperfect information1. Studying non-point source pollution 
(Segerson 1988) or moral hazard in team (Holmstrom 1982), several authors have nonetheless 
1 Dinar and Xepapadeas (2002) studied partially observed groundwater withdrawals as an input of partially 
observed pollution emissions (Dinar and Xepapadeas 2002). 
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2designed incentive instruments adapted to imperfect information settings. Segerson (1988) 
proposes a target based mechanism (TBM) where an authority able to estimate the aggregate 
pollution emissions of a well-defined group imposes to each group member a tax (or a 
subsidy) proportional to the difference between observed group emission level and the group 
target. . She shows that for a sufficiently high level of the ambient tax, the Nash equilibrium 
yields an aggregate pollution level equal to the group target. Giordana and Montginoul (2006) 
point out that such a TBM is well suited to manage unobserved groundwater withdrawals 
since withdrawals of a well-defined group can be approximated by the groundwater table 
level monitored at some observation points (Giordana and Montginoul 2006). By analogy 
with non-point source pollution, we name unobserved groundwater withdrawals non-point 
withdrawals. The ambient tax (subsidy) would be charged (paid) if the groundwater table falls 
below (above) the target level set by a regulator. 
Although theoretically appealing, TBM are rarely implemented in real world situations for 
numerous technical, practical and political reasons (Shortle and Horan 2001)2. In our opinion, 
the two decisive reasons for the lack of success of TBM are: 
(i) The lack of acceptability: even agents who supply a costly effort to reduce their 
individual emissions may be liable for the collective tax if the group pollution exceeds 
the target. This can be challenged socially as a very unfair sanction and can even be 
considered unlawful by many legal systems. Reichhuber et al. (2009) mentioned the use 
of a TBM for forest protection in Costa Rica that has been abolished due to unfairness 
(Reichhuber et al. 2009). 
(ii) The imprecise link existing between group behaviour and the observation of this 
behaviour by the regulator.
The distinction between point source and non-point source problems depends on the cost of 
observing individual behaviour (Millock et al. 2002). In the groundwater case, increasing 
observability is feasible by inventorying wells and metering withdrawals. Several authors 
support the introduction of an individual dimension to TBM by increasing observability to 
2 For some examples see Ribaudo and Caswell (1999) and Segerson (1999) and for an overview of the practical 
conditions under which TBM are the most suited, see Weersink et al. (1998) (Weersink et al. 1998; Ribaudo and 
Caswell 1999; Segerson 1999).  
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3overcome the issue of acceptability (Xepapadeas 1995; Dinar and Xepapadeas 2002). We 
define combined TBM as mechanisms combining group-based and individual-based 
mechanisms, and optional TBM giving the choice between individual or group mechanisms. 
Xepapadeas (1995) studies an optimal combined TBM under uncertainty. A mix of individual 
and group taxes leads agents to reveal all or part of their individual behaviour. Kritikos (2004) 
develops an optimal combined TBM with individual and group taxes along with random 
inspection. The individual tax is paid if the inspection reveals that the agent used more his 
declared withdrawals (Kritikos 2004). Studying the impact of groups’ cooperation on TBM, 
Millock and Salanié (2005) propose an optional TBM: agents must choose between a 
monitoring system with an individual tax and a TBM where group taxes depend on the 
cooperation level of groups (Millock and Salanié 2005). Karp (2005) extends Millock and 
Salanié‘s mechanism to a dynamic setting, addressing groups’ cooperation as the formation of 
clubs purchasing monitoring equipments (Karp 2005). 
None of these papers do combine a TBM with an individual quota system. The latter may 
however be preferred by water users. Molle and Berkoff (2007) recall that a quota system 
“appears a far more satisfactory and practical solution to water savings in almost all real-life 
circumstances” due to transparency, administrative simplicity and because it ensures equity 
among users without imposing additional income losses (Molle and Berkoff 2007). 
We focus in this paper on practical aspects of the implementation of an OTMB adapted to 
manage non-point withdrawals in an agricultural context: acceptability, information 
asymmetry and contract duration. We test in a contextualised lab experiment an optional 
TBM proposing a choice between (i) a no contract situation where farmers are liable for a 
TBM (e.g. a blind truncheon) and (ii) a contract situation where an individual quota is 
allocated to the signatory farmer, provided he changes his irrigation technology, reveals 
information on his withdrawals and accepts to be controlled by a regulating authority if the 
group’s withdrawals exceeds the target. We assume that the control can only ascertain 
whether a farmer exceeds his quota or not, but not by how much. A contractor is thus liable 
for a group tax if a control proves he exceeded his quota (e.g. a one-eyed stick). This 
mechanism enables any complying agent to escape the group tax. The remainder of this paper 
is organised as follows. Section 2 formally develops the optional TBM. The experimental 
procedure and hypothesis are described in section 3 while section 4 presents lab results.  
Author-produced version 
in : Annual Conference of European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, Rome, ITA 29 June - 2 July 2011 
4Section 5 links these results to practical aspects of a real world implementation of the optional 
TBM. Section 6 concludes. 
2. THE OPTIONAL TARGET BASED MECHANISM 
In this section we present an optional TBM which improves the acceptability issue. 
2.1. Baseline 







collectively from an aquifer. Each agent has the profit function 0 ( )jR w , increasing, concave 
and twice differentiable in jw . Due to technical or agronomic constraints, let be 
0
jw w≤  the 
maximum water volume each agent can withdraw. Profit maximization imposes agents to 
withdraw w  each to earn 0 0( )R R w= . The collective withdrawals equals 0 0nw W= .
2.2. No contract situation: a blind truncheon based on a simple TMB 
Consider now a regulating authority (i) able to estimate perfectly the aggregate behavior of 
the n agents (ii) willing to impose each agent to withdraw * 0w w< . Unable to observe jw , he 
imposes to the n agents a group target * *W nw= . If the group withdraws *W W> , each of the 
group member must pay the group tax 0 0 *.( - )j j W Wθ τ= . If *W W≤ , nothing appends. 
2.3. Contract situation: a one-eyed stick combining a TMB with quotas and random 
controls 
Knowing that the blind truncheon mechanism might be massively rejected, the manager 
proposes to each agent a contract which (i) allocates the quota *w , (ii) imposes to declare each 
borehole possessed, (iii) and to measure individual withdrawals (iv) subsidises a change of 
irrigation technique (v) imposes that the farmer cooperates fully in case of inspection. 
An agent signing the contract has a new profit function 1( )jR w , with 
1 0
jw w w< <  and 







. Contracting enables a more efficient use of water so 1 0( ) ( )j jR w R w> , 
1
jw w∀ < . Maximizing profit, contractors however loose compare to the no contract 
situation: 1 0R R< .
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5Since * 1w w< , there is no guarantee that a contracting agent respects his quota. If the 
manager observes the group overtakes groundwater (i.e. *W W> ), he imposes to contracting 
agents a random inspection occurring with a probability [0,1]ϕ ∈ . If the inspection reveals that 
the agent respected his contract (i.e. *jw w< ) or if the agent is not controlled, then he pays no 
tax. Else he is liable for the group tax 1 1 *.( - )j j W Wθ τ= . We assume here that controlling 
authorities are unable to measure precisely the excess quantity withdrawn by a contracting 
agent. In practice, farmers can cheat with a skewed meter or an undeclared borehole.  
Figure 1: Description of the mechanism.  
Figure 1 resumes the optional TBM. The right side of the tree represents the blind truncheon 
where a group tax is applied in case of group overtaking. The left side schematizes the one-
eyed stick with random inspections occurring in case of group overtaking and the payment of 
a group tax if a control reveals an agent has cheated his contract. To avoid certainly being 
liable for a group tax, one can see that a complying agent has to sign the proposed contract 
and to withdraw *jw w≤ . Doing so he will pay no group tax whether controlled or not. 
2.4. Incentive tax rates 
The aim of the authority is to induce the n agents (i) to sign up the contract during the so-
called contract stage and (ii) to respect the contract by withdrawing *jw w≤  through minimal 
tax rates during the so-called volume stage.
Looking at the volume stage, it is straightforward that equation 1 defines the minimal tax rate 
ensuring that a contracting agent will withdraw *jw w= , provided he is not risk-lover. Under 
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   [1]   
Looking at the contract stage, one can address the blind truncheon as a threat obliging agents 
to sign up. Under [1], 0*τ must be set so the expected profit with no contract is lower or equal 
to *R . Let be 0w  the water volume maximising the expected profit in the no contract situation.
It can be shown that 0*τ , the minimal tax rate insuring that any non risk-lover agent will sign 
up the contract, is defined by equations 2: 
0


















  [2b] 
The minimal incentive tax rate equals then the water marginal value with no contract at the 
point where this marginal value equals the per water unit gain from not contracting and 
overtaking water.  
Figure 2: Graphic presentation of the impact of the mechanism on agent’s profit. 
Figure 2 graphically illustrates the incentive tax rates calculation in a case of symmetric 
players, with in light green the contract situation, and in dark green the no contract situation.
3 Risk-adverse agents will withdraw *jw w= too since this behavior guaranties the secured pay-off
*R . 
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72.5. Impact of an over-stated group target 
In the case of groundwater, authority estimates the group withdrawal W  by observing 
groundwater table level Ω . This estimate is imprecise due to the complexity of the 
relationship between withdrawals and the water table level. To be sure of triggering the 
optional TBM if and only if *W W> , authority may voluntarily decide to increase the 
threshold above which the group is submitted to the collective sanction. Assume that the 
water table signaling a total withdrawal of *W  is *Ω . Assume however that there is positive 
probability that there is a mistake in measuring the link between the two: for example 
( , )N W σΩ ≡ . To avoid punishing the group when the target withdrawal is not exceeded, the 
threshold is set at *( , )IR N W IR σΩ ≡ +  with 0IR ≥  being proportional to the estimate quality 
of the group behavior (i.e. the hydrogeological knowledge of authority).  
In practice, authority sets up IRΩ  at the beginning of the irrigation period. Farmers can 
however daily know Ω  by observing the water table level into boreholes. We assume that 
farmers do have better information than authority and that IR can be interpreted as an 
informational rent4.
Under such a rent, the incentive tax rates defined by equations 1 and 2 still incite agents to 
sign up, provided the informational rent is not too important5. They however miss in inciting 
agents to withdraw *jw w= . Each situation where 
*W W IR= +  and j∀ , *jw w≥  constitutes a 
Pareto-efficient equilibrium. All those equilibrium are asymmetric but for the one where each 
agent withdraws *jw w IR n= + . The informational rent is thus a source of inequity among 
agents and may thus impact acceptability of the optional TBM. We wonder thus about the 
ability of agents (i) to enjoy the informational rent and (ii) the way they would enjoy it in a 
real world situation. To address this issue we set up the following experimental design. 
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
In this section, we first describe the practical procedure of the experiment and then present the 
specific parameters we used. We finally derive and discuss the corresponding predictions. 
4 Authority may in practice define two reference levels: a first one warning users that there are suspicions of 
group overtaking and a second one below which sanctions and controls are triggered.  
5 Let be 'w the water volume giving 0 1( ')R w R= . This proposition holds for *( ' )IR n w w≤ − . 
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83.1 Practical procedure 
The experiment was run at the Montpellier‘s Laboratory of Experimental Economics (LEEM) 
in June 2010. A total of 51 subjects were recruited randomly with economic or scientific 
background. Five 2-hour sessions were carried out, each session gathering between 4 or 6 
groups of three subjects. Each subject earned an average payoff of 20 € plus a 10 € fixed 
payoff (5 € if subjects study on the LEEM site). Subjects were split into 3-subject groups of 
“irrigating farmers” with no possibility to communicate and were unable to identify the 2 
other group members. They do physically interact only with experimenters for instructions 
and payment, and a computer for playing6. Each session lasted 35 periods, three treatments 
were successively played.  
3.2. The treatments 
Three treatments were played in each session (within subject treatments): treatment 0 serves 
as a baseline while treatments T and D are the core of the experiment. In each treatment, 
subjects play a 2 stage game with, at each period, first a contract stage – each subject decides 
whether he contracts or not and is warned about the number of contracting subjects in its 
group – and second a volume stage – each subject decides how much water he withdraws. 
Treatment 0 lasts for 5 periods only. Subjects are given the group target and individual 
quotas, but they know that there is no control or sanctions. 
Treatments T and D last for 15 periods each. Groups are rematched after periods 5 and 10. 
Each group of 5 periods can be considered a “supergame” in which repetition with the same 
players can help coordination7. The optional TBM is introduced with an informational rent as 
explained in section 2.5. Treatment D differs from treatment T in that once signed up, a 
contract lasts until the end of a supergame. Here “T” reminds a temporary contract (i.e. 
lasting a single period) and “D” a definitive one (i.e. lasting until the end of the supergame). 
6 The computer interface was run with the Z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007). Instructions are available in 
French upon request. 
7 We thus used a partner design with a rematching procedure which is close to the one set up by Selten and 
Stoecker (1986) to address end-behaviour in repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (Selten and Stoecker 1986). This 
design has been carried out (i) because partner design is likely to be more realistic than strangers design when 
policies are implemented in non-point situations (Cochard et al. 2005) (ii) to disentangle learning from 
coordination effects.  
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9A long-term contract implies that farmers are bound by their commitment and are unable to 
use a trial and error strategy. It is important to notice that if different in the contract stage, 
treatments T and D are equivalent in the volume stage (provided the same number of subjects 
have signed up).  
Adopting a within procedure, we do not randomly assign group. Groups in the first supergame 
in treatment T were the same as in treatment D (ditto in second and third supergames). 
Comparing treatment 0 and T isolates the TBM effect, while comparing treatment T and D 
controls for the contract duration effect. We further test for an order effect between treatment 
T and D with 33 subjects playing treatment 0, T and then D and 18 subjects playing O, D and 
then T. We finally observe 51 subjects playing within 17 independent groups in treatment 0 
and 51 quasi independent groups in treatment T and D. 
3.3. Parameters 
Sessions were run with groups of M = 3 subjects having the same two-part linear profit 
function ( )k jR w  depending on whether they sign (k = 1) or not (k = 0) the proposed contract. 
The profit function, expressed in tokens, can be summarized as follows: 
* *( ) (13 ).min( , ) 6.max( - ,0)k j j jR w k w w w w= + +
Water marginal value equals 13+k tokens before the quota limit is reached and 6 tokens 
beyond. The following table provide the value of the main parameters. 
Table 1: Parameters used in the lab. 
Parameters k=0 k=1 
kw 95 units 80 units 
*w - 50 units 
kR 970 tokens 930 tokens 
*R - 750 tokens 
Since the quota value is * 50w = units, the group target equals * 150W =  units. In treatments T 
and D, we assume that the informational rent 30IR =  units so that controls and sanctions are 
undertaken only if the group withdraws collectively 180W >  units. We set up the probability 
control of contracting subjects in case of excess total withdrawals at 0.25ϕ =  so that 
equations [1] and [2] give the following minimal incentive tax rates: 
1* 0*
(0.25) 24 and 6τ τ= =  [3] 
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3.4. Theoretical and conjectural hypothesis 
TREATMENT 0
1) Subjects do not sign the contract and withdraw 95 units each. In the absence of any 
sanction, a subject maximizing his gain will refuse to sign the contract and will withdraw the 
maximum amount. We thus predict any subject not to sign and to withdraw 0 95w =  units 
while a group will withdraw 285W =  units. 
TREATMENT T AND TREATMENT D 
Contract stage 
2) All subjects sign the contract in both treatments.  
With the tax rates given by equation [3] it is a dominant strategy to sign the proposed contract 
in both treatments. Contract duration has thus no theoretical impact on the contract stage.
3) Due to learning, an order effect may exist in treatment D.
Subjects may be reluctant to commit definitively because there are unable to experiment the 
contract before backtracking: the definitive contract may restrict learning. When treatment T 
is introduced to subjects before treatment D, the contract situation has already been 
experienced by subjects and the definitive nature of the contract should have no impact. 
Conversely, when treatment D is played before, subjects may fear to sign up the contract 
because they cannot come back to the no-contract situation until the end of the supergame. If 
true, this may lead to the observation of an order effect, that is, a significant difference 
between contracting occurrences according to the order subjects face both treatments. 
Attention is paid to the first period of each supergame and to the first supergame as a whole. 
Volume stage: at group level 
We remind that treatments T and D are equivalent during the volume stage provided groups 
have the same number of contractors. Assuming that groups are composed by 3 contractors: 
4) Some subjects will exceed their quota; it is Pareto-optimal to seek collectively the 
informational rent. 
Since contracting subjects may withdraw 50 80jw≤ ≤ , the game constitutes a 3-player 31-
choice (subjects can only choose integer values for withdrawals) coordination game with 
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313 = 29 791 outcomes8. Each of the 496 outcomes where 180W =  is Pareto-optimal. Subjects 
have thus an interest in coordinating their withdrawals on one of these equilibria9.
5) Coordination will increase with repetition.
Repetition in a partner design is a coordination device since it gives information on the 
behavior of the other members of the group. Reducing the strategic uncertainty, repetition is 
likely to increase coordination so that W  converges to the trigger point with periods. To 
ascertain the increase in coordination is due to the reduction of strategic uncertainty we design 
our experiment in a quasi-partner way, i.e. by rematching groups after a 5-period supergame. 
If the magnitude of the convergence within groups (if convergence) is still important during 
the last supergames, coordination increase can be seen as a reduction of strategic uncertainty. 
Volume stage: at individual level 
6) We test the hypotheses that a focal point is to coordinate on an equal sharing of the 
informational rent.  
The game is akin to a discrete Chicken game with a cooperative outcome. The Chicken game 
(also known as a Hawk-Dove game) simulates a situation “where [agents] differ strongly over 
which equilibrium is preferred, where a Pareto-optimal but non-equilibrium compromise 
outcome is available to cooperative [agents] and disaster occurs in the form of the mutually 
worst outcome if neither cooperates” (Snidal 1991). Here, the “disaster” is the trigger of the 
one-eyed stick and each subject “prefers” the asymmetric outcome where he withdraws 
80jw =  units and the 2 others 50iw =  units. The preferred outcome constitutes a Nash 
equilibrium in pure strategy, but this equilibrium is threefold and no dominant strategy exists. 
One can thus hardly expect coordination to occur in a Chicken game due to strategic 
uncertainty, i.e. the fact of not knowing the strategy adopted by the others. Disasters ( 180W > ) 
or inefficient outcomes ( 180W < ) are likely to occur.
Our game indeed differs from a classical one-shot Chicken game because we introduce two 
coordination devices – reciprocation and repetition (Bornstein et al. 1997) – that are pregnant 
8 Withdrawing 50jw <  would be irrational. We exclude this possibility from the analysis. 
9 A Pareto-optimal outcome means there is no other equilibrium with greater or equal payoffs to all subjects and 
a strictly higher payoff to at least one subject. 
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in an agricultural context10. The discrete choice feature of our game mimics the ability play in 
mixed-strategy in a 2-choice Chicken game. The equilibrium where each subject withdraws 
* 60jw w IR n= + =  is Pareto-optimal. Being a symmetric equilibrium, it constitutes the 
cooperative outcome of the game and a focal-point (Schelling 1960). Subjects are thus more 
likely to coordinate than in a pure Chicken game. 
Repetition impacts cooperation with 2 counteracting forces. On one hand, repetition may help 
in establishing confidence helping subject to settle on the cooperative equilibrium. Some 
experiments reveal that players are able to cooperate in repeated Chicken game without 
symmetric equilibrium – by adopting mixed-strategy, i.e. through turn-taking (Deutsch and 
Lewicki 1970; Bornstein et al. 1997). One can thus expect the cooperative equilibrium to be 
often reached in our game. On the other hand, repetition gives information on group 
members’ behavior. Due to subjects’ anticipations, believes and motivations, the cooperative 
equilibrium is likely to be unstable. The following story illustrates this instability: 
“After a first period of equal sharing, subjects A withdraws in period 2 more than 
the cooperative strategy betting he will not be controlled in case group 
overtaking. Subjects B and C observe the above behavior and escape the group 
mechanism by withdrawing * 50w =  in period 3. Observing B and C’s behavior, 
subject A takes the “shares” left by B and C and withdraw 1 80w =  in period 4.” 
This story recalls the first mover advantage in repeated Chicken game. Preemption is there 
another coordination device (Bornstein et al. 1997) and arm wrestling between subjects to 
capture the rent may result in reaching stable asymmetric Pareto-optimal equilibrium. We 
identify 3 strategies likely to be often chosen by contracting subjects: 
 The Dove strategy where a subject withdraws 50jw = and escape the group sanction. It 
may reflect the will of escaping an arm wrestling or be related with risk aversion. 
 The Cooperative strategy where a subject withdraws 60jw =  to share equally the 
informational rent. 
10 A third important coordination device is communication which could mimic irrigators unions already existing 
worldwide in many irrigated areas. 
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 The Pure hawk strategy where a subject withdraws 80jw = to capture the rent share of 
other subjects. It may reflect the will of engage in arm wrestling or risk behavior. It 
can be interpreted as free-riding too11.
We wonder whether subjects will converge to or diverge from the cooperative equilibrium.  
The equity issue 
7) Will subjects judge the optional TBM as equitable?
Asking 76 irrigating farmers about group taxes, Montginoul and Rinaudo (2009) found an 
acceptance rate of 0% (Montginoul and Rinaudo 2009). Enabling complying subjects to 
escape surely the one-eyed stick, we expect our mechanism would perform better. We do not 
however ask subjects about acceptability but rather about equity since it would be 
incongruous to ask students whether they would “accept” such an instrument or not. The 
acceptability issue seems however to the authors closely linked to the inequity one. The 
informational rent being a source of inequity among subjects, we fear the optional TBM will 
be judged as inequitable by our subject pool. The following section presents the main 
experimental results. 
4. RESULTS
We first present the experimental results of the first supergame carried out in treatment 0 and 
then jointly the results from the 6 supergames conducted under treatments T and D. 
4.1. Treatment 0 
1) A large minority of contracts are signed and efforts are made to reduce water withdrawals.
Although there are no financial reasons for signing and/or withdrawing less than allowed, 
some subjects frequently do so. A majority of subjects refuse the contract, but 36.4% of 
proposed contracts are signed, so that groups do contain 1.1 contractor in average. Groups are 
thus able to withdraw up to 1 01.1 (3 1.1) 268.6w w× + − × = units, but they “only” withdraw 
244.3 units in average with a high dispersion (Figure 3). The environmental target is even 
reached in nearly 5.5% of cases.  
11 The game can be seen as a threshold public bad game: each subject has to choose the amount he invests in a 
collective account (or avoided withdrawal) and below a given amount of collective investment, a public bad is 
produced (the one-eyed stick).  
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Figure 3: Average and standard deviation of the volume withdrawn by groups according to treatment. 
4.2. Treatment T and D 
Contract stage 
2) A minority of contracts are not signed. 
85.5% (respectively 86.7%) of the proposed contracts are signed by subjects in treatment T 
(treatment D). This percentage increases during supergames and from a supergame to another. 
All the three members of a group are under contract in 63.1% (65.1%) of cases. 
2’) There is no contract duration effect.  
Looking at the number of contracting subjects per group, there is no significant difference 
between treatments T and D (p = 0.517, paired WMW test). If the average percentage of 
contract situation in the first period of each supergame is lower in treatment D (78.4%) than 
in treatment T (84.3%), the number of signed contracts per group is not significantly lower 
(p = 0.1406, one-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) test). In treatment D, the first 
period average percentage of contract situation is much lower than later on (from 85.6% to 
92.2%). if the existence of an effect cannot be totally rejected, it is at least partially due to the 
cumulative nature of sign occurrence in treatment D. 
3) There is an overall order effect on signing in treatment D.
The average commitment rate in treatment D is 89.5% if treatment T is played before 
treatment D, and 81.5% else. This difference is significant (p < 0.001, WMW one-sided test): 
an overall order effect exists in treatment D. Focusing on first played supergame and first 
played periods, this effect surprisingly vanish (p >0.11 in both cases) The order effect is 
inexistent during the first period and the first supergame but appears later on: learning is not a 
reasonable explanation for the order effect.
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Volume stage: at group level 
4) The collective target is exceeded.  
Figure 3 displays group withdrawals in each treatment. The comparison between treatment 0 
and treatments T and D shows a clear TBM effect: the average group volume drops from 244.3 
units in treatment 0 to 180.6 and 181.5 units in treatments T and D. This effect falls short of 
the target *W = 150 units which is less respected than in treatment 0 (3.53% of cases). 
4’) Subjects coordinate on the trigger point, but inefficient equilibria are often reached.  
Looking at Figure 3, one can see that group volumes do not statistically differ from the trigger 
point (p > 0.35 in both treatments, WMW test). Group volume however equals 180 units in 
only 20.0% (27.8%) in treatment T (treatment D) while the one-eyed stick is triggered in 
nearly one third of cases (24.8% and 37.3%). 
5) Repetition within a group improves coordination within a group.
From this point, some choices have been made in analyzing the data. First, to ease the 
analysis, we focus on the 64.1% of groups with 3 contracting members. Second, as 
coordination evolves during the experiment, we analyze our data keeping periods and 
supergames as explanatory variables. This means we pool data of treatments T and D carried 
out in different orders since 31 subjects played treatment T (D) during supergames 2 to 4 (5 to 
7), and 18 subjects played treatment T (D) during supergames 5 to 7 (2 to 4). This is expected 
to have no impact on data since treatments T and D are equivalent during the volume stage. 
We finally found that coordination increases with periods but not with supergames. 
Figure 4: Group volume according to period and supergame. Data from 3-contractor groups. 
Looking at average group withdrawals (Figure 4), equilibrium types occurences (Figure 5) 
and group volume dispersion (Figure 6), three observations can be made. First, the volume 
withdrawn by groups tends to increase with both periods and supergames to get closer to (and 
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sometimes exceed) the trigger point in average. Group withdrawals increase for example from 
177.7 to 180.4 units from period 1 to period 5, while from 174.0 to 181.4 units from 
supergame 2 to supergame 7. Groups tend to shift upward their withdrawals risking “disaster” 
rather than under-exploiting the informational rent.  
Figure 5: Evolution of the occurrence of “disaster” (W>180), coordination (W=180) and respected target 
(W150) according to period and supergame. Data from 3-contractor groups. 
Second, coordination seems to decay from a supergame to another. Figure 5 presents the 
frequency of different equilibrium types according to period and supergame. As group volume 
increases toward the trigger, one can expect that the one-eyed stick will be implemented more 
frequently by authority with periods and supergames. This is clearly the case with supergames 
since the occurrence of disaster almost doubles from nearly 20% up to roughly 40%: seeking 
the rent, subjects fail in coordinating sufficiently to avoid the sanction. Coordination decays 
but for the last supergame.  
Third, coordination equilibria are more frequently reached with repetition within groups. Its 
occurrence rises from 17.0% to 27.4%. Despite groups increase withdrawals, repetition 
improves coordination to avoid disaster: sanction occurrence falls from 35.9% to 30.1%.   
Figure 6: Coefficient of variation of volume withdrawn by groups and subjects according to period and 
supergame. Data from 3-contractor groups.  
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One can synthesize the above information looking at the coefficient of variation of group 
volumes in Figure 6 (red bold curve). The lower the dispersion of group volumes, the more 
likely the Pareto-optimal outcome, and the more successful the cooperation. One can see a 
decrease of the coefficient of variation with periods from 10.1% to 7.7%. This confirms 
coordination improvement within groups: group volumes tend to converge with periods. 
Notice that no convergence appears with supergames.  
To conclude, groups tend to increase withdrawals with periods and supergames. On the one 
hand, repeating the game within the same group allows subjects to compensate this increase 
through a better coordination to avoid the one-eyed stick. On the other hand, the experiment 
going on, groups apparently fail in improving coordination changing from a group to another. 
The general rise in group volume leads to a more frequent use of the one-eyed stick. 
Volume stage: at individual level 
6) The cooperative strategy is not a focal point; the dove strategy is more frequently chosen.  
We focus now on data at the individual level. If a high heterogeneity of withdrawing 
strategies exists, around 80% of this heterogeneity is resumed by our 3 expected strategies. 
The dove one is most used with 41.8% of occurrence. Subjects do comply much more than 
one could expect. The cooperative strategy has been played only in 25.2% of cases and seems 
at first glance far from being a focal point. The pure hawk strategy has been chosen in 14.7% 
of cases that is roughly as much as intermediate strategies with 60 < jw < 80 units (13.7%) that 
we latter call the hawk strategy. 
6’) If strategies are globally stable, some subjects individually adopt first a predefined 
strategy before adapting to the behavior of the group.  
We look at the stability of individual behaviour by analysing the coefficient of variation of the 
volume withdrawn by each subject and its evolution with periods and supergames (blue thin 
curve in Figure 6). While volume dispersion decreases at group level, the dispersion of 
individual choices interestingly increases within groups between period 1 and 3 from 4.6% to 
roughtly 10%. This reflects that subjects routinely adopt a given strategy during period 1 
before diverging from this strategy. This divergence points that subjects gradually adapt their 
strategy according to the behaviour of the different groups they play with. 
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Figure 7 presents the evolution of the three identified strategies occurrence with periods and 
supergames plus the hawk strategy. The dove strategy is more chosen during the first period 
(46.5%) and the first supergame (47.1%) than latter (stable close around 40%). Some subjects 
use thus this strategy as a safe haven before apprehending clearly both the rules of the game 
and the behavior of other group members. Notice further that subjects rarely chose other 
strategies than the 3 identified in period 1 (9.4%): subjects prefer to follow routinely one of 
the identified strategies before adapting.  
Figure 7: Individual strategy occurrence in treatment T and D according to period and supergame. Data 
from 3-contractor groups.  
We wonder about the stability of the cooperative strategy within groups. Its occurrence is 
constant with periods (between 25.7% and 27.0%): it does not “attract” subjects as should a 
focal point. A slight end game effect even appears in period 5 (21.5%).  
If no clear pattern emerges by period, the pure hawk strategy is more frequently used as the 
session progresses: chosen in 9.4% of cases during supergame 2, its occurrence roughly 
double to reach 19.1% in supergame 7. Other strategies being roughly constant, the increase 
of disaster occurrence with supergames is provoked by an uncompensated increase of pure 
hawk occurrence. Since this strategy can be interpreted in term of free-riding, this evolution 
echoes the increase of free-riding in repeated public good games12.
To conclude on subjects coordination, let first underline that the cooperative strategy does not 
exhibit the property of a focal point since too few subjects chose it. A potential explanation is 
that the difference between gains before sanction of cooperative and dove strategies are to 
close. The expected gain from risking cooperation is insufficiently incentive compare to 
12 For concrete data, see for example papers from Cadsby and Maynes studying threshold public good games 
(Cadsby and Maynes 1998, 1999). In our experiment, the trigger point assumes the role of the threshold. 
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securing gains by escaping the one-eyed stick. Potential cooperators may thus behave as dove.
This explanation is consistent with the high number of subjects respecting the quota. Second, 
the first supergame and first periods act as observation rounds between members of a same 
group. The dove strategy enables subjects to wait and see, mainly during first periods where  
the strategic uncertainty is the highest. Third, the increasing number of pure hawk we observe 
with supergames is responsible for the increase in group volumes and sanction occurrence. 
The experiment progressing, free-riders endanger coordination. 
The equity issue 
7) The subject pool is divided on the equity issue.
We asked the following question to subjects: “Does the system of control and differentiated 
sanctions in treatments T and D seem equitable to you?”. 49% do answer negatively and 47% 
positively. If our mechanim do not achieve unanimity, equity is apparently not an insuperable 
hurdle to the implementation of the optinal TBM , even with a mispecified target. 
5. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF THE EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Our results show a clear effect of the control and sanction mechanism on both contracting and 
withdrawals. The existence of an informational rent however impedes the respect of the 
environmental group target. The mechanism only shifts average withdrawals down to the 
trigger point. If our mechanism is not robust to the informational rent, the later is likely to 
decrease as the hydrogeological knowledge of the authority improves. The smaller the rent, 
the less the cooperative strategy pays off compare to the dove one. Quotas are thus likely to 
be increasingly respected with time. 
The number of contracting subjects does impact the group volume. Increasing the amount of 
the blind truncheon – keeping the one-eyed stick equal – would increase the percentage of 
contractors and thus decrease group volume.  
Groups increase withdrawals with periods and supergames, willing to seek the informational 
rent. Willing to avoid disaster, they do improve coordination within group but not from a 
group to another. Individual strategies seem to be relatively stable with time at the global 
level, but subjects individually change their strategies to adapt the group behavior. An 
uncompensated increase of rent seeking strategy occurrence from group to group endanger the 
effectiveness of coordination. Furthermore, the observed rise of withdrawals within group 
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poses the following questions: what if more than 5 periods? Would groups exceed the 
trigger? By much?
In real world, farmers are unlikely to be frequently rematched. We should pay more attention 
to the evolution with periods than with supergames. The rise of coordination within groups 
presents 2 major advantages for a regulating authority. First, the decrease of “disaster” 
occurrence limits the implementation cost of the mechanism (control cost) and the financial 
transfers between farmers and the authority. Second, the decrease of group volume dispersion 
by implementing the optional TBM (Figure 3) is accentuated with periods (Figure 6). The 
authority will thus better anticipate the collective impact of withdrawals on the water 
resource. The increasing dispersion of the volumes withdrawn by subjects however induces 
that individual behaviors are less and less predictable. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Imperfect information impedes the use of classical instruments – tax, quotas or water markets 
– to manage groundwater withdrawals in numerous real-world cases, mainly in an agricultural 
context. Target based mechanisms that have been developed in a context of moral hazard in 
team management or of non-point source pollution can be suited to address the issue of non-
point groundwater withdrawals. The implementation of those mechanisms seems to be 
hindered for practical and political reasons among which a blatant lack of acceptability by 
water users. 
In this paper, we develop and test in the lab an optional target based mechanism combining (i) 
group taxes based on a collective target and differentiated depending on whether private 
information is revealed or not with (ii) a system of individual quotas and random inspections. 
Agents are incited to reveal information and to comply with the individual quota. Conversely 
to previously developed target based mechanism, we enable complying agents to escape 
surely group sanctions so that they do not bear any excess burden but the cost of reducing 
groundwater withdrawals.  
The mechanism is however not robust to a mispecified collective target and people repetingly 
interacting achieve to coordinate to exhauste the informational rent without suffering much 
the group sanction. Despite this rent is a source of inequity, equity is apparently not an 
insuperable hurdle to the practical implementation of the optinal TBM. 
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